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1.  Introduction 
Evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism aim to show that moral 
facts have no role to play in the evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs, which in 
turn is meant to jeopardize the epistemic status of those beliefs, at least by realist lights.1 
Our aim here is to assess what has emerged as the dominant response to the debunking 
arguments. According to what we dub the ‘minimalist response’, one can resist the 
arguments without having to affirm that moral facts explain or are explained by moral 
beliefs.2 Although the response can take a variety of different forms, the most common 
manifestation attempts to vindicate moral beliefs by showing how they could still (in a 
sense) track the truth even in the absence of the indicated explanatory connection.  
When spelled out in detail, the minimalist response is at once vexing and enticing. 
It is vexing because it seems too easy. As we shall see, the minimalist’s reasoning 
invariably rests on assumptions about which behaviors are in fact ethical—for instance that 
helping one’s children is good—assumptions to which the respondent seems not to be 
entitled in the context of answering the debunker. But it is enticing insofar as it gets by 
with minimal metaphysical and explanatory commitments (hence the label ‘minimalism’), 
promising to explain our moral reliability without having to abandon moral realism, reduce 
the moral to the natural, imbue irreducible moral facts with the power to influence our 
beliefs, or introduce unnecessary complexity by working moral facts into the evolutionary 
                                               
1 Such arguments have been advanced by Ruse (1985: ch. 6), Gibbard (2003: ch. 13), 
Lillehammer (2003), Kitcher (2005), Joyce (2006), Street (2006), and Braddock (2016). 
2 Minimalist responses—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors 
strategies” or “pre-established harmony”—have been advanced or defended by Nozick 
(1981: 342-348), Dworkin (1996: 117-126), Huemer (2005: 218-219), Schafer (2010, 
forthcoming), Enoch (2010: §§3-5, 2011: §7.4), White (2010: 588-589), Wielenberg 
(2010: §§4-8, 2014: ch. 4, 2016: §3), Brosnan (2011: 60-63), Parfit (2011: 532-533), 
Skarsaune (2011: §3), Berker (2014), Clarke-Doane (2015: §§4-6, 2016: §§2-4), Talbott 
(2015), Vavova (2015: §6), Baras (2017b), and Moon (2017). 
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explanations of our moral beliefs. If the response can make good on that promise, then we 
can evidently escape the debunking arguments entirely unscathed. 
Our aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to redirect the debate over minimalist 
responses, which has centered mainly on the charge that they are in one way or another 
“question-begging”—a charge that, we argue, is misguided. We think that the debate 
should instead be focused on a certain assumption about epistemic priority that lies at the 
heart of the minimalist response. Namely, that discovering that moral beliefs are not 
influenced by moral facts could undermine those beliefs only by way of demonstrating that 
they do not track the moral truth. Our second aim is to challenge this assumption by arguing 
that such explanatory information defeats directly: it is not in virtue of something else that 
such explanatory revelations undermine belief. 
We conclude, not that the debunking argument succeeds, but rather that realists 
must disavow minimalism and embrace some account on which the moral facts explain our 
moral beliefs.  
 
2. The Debunking Argument 
To paraphrase an old Jewish joke: ask two philosophers, get three formulations of 
the evolutionary debunking argument. What follows may or may not be the best available 
to the debunker, but it will serve as an illuminating foil for the minimalist response.  
Let’s start by introducing two bits of terminology: e-connected (‘e’ for 
‘explanatory’) and m-connected (‘m’ for ‘modal’). One’s moral beliefs are e-connected 
iffdef moral facts either explain or are explained by one’s moral beliefs. One’s moral beliefs 
are m-connected iffdef one’s moral beliefs bear some epistemically significant modal 
relation to moral facts.3 Putative examples of epistemically significant modal relations 
include safety, sensitivity, reliability, and non-accidental accuracy.  
The debunking argument can then be rendered as follows: 
(P1)  Realists are rationally committed to believing that their moral beliefs are not 
e-connected.  
                                               
3 Cf. Enoch (2011: 174).  
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(P2)  If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s moral beliefs are not e-
connected, then one is rationally committed to believing that one’s moral 
beliefs are not m-connected. 
(P3)  If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s moral beliefs are not 
m-connected, then one is rationally committed to withholding from moral 
beliefs. 
(C)  So, realists are rationally committed to withholding from moral beliefs. 
 
P1 says that it is irrational, given the available evidence, to accept both realism and 
that one’s moral beliefs are e-connected. The idea is that, because realists are committed 
to denying that moral beliefs explain the moral facts, they can affirm that moral beliefs are 
e-connected only by affirming that moral facts explain our moral beliefs. But (the idea 
goes) there is a broadly evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs, and moral facts have 
no role to play within that evolutionary explanation. Strategies for resisting this premise 
include downplaying the role of evolutionary forces in shaping our current moral beliefs, 
reducing moral facts to the very natural facts cited in the debunker’s evolutionary 
explanations, or finding a place for irreducible moral facts in the explanation of our moral 
beliefs (e.g., as proximate causes or as guiding the decisions of an intelligent designer).4 
The idea behind P2 is that the absence of such explanatory connections ordinarily 
gives you strong reason to think that your beliefs aren’t m-connected. Suppose that you’ve 
been using your magic 8-ball to find out who has a crush on you. Once you realize that it’s 
just a toy, and that the facts about who does and doesn’t have a crush on you are in no way 
influencing the beliefs you’ve formed about who has a crush on you, you should then 
believe that it is at best a “lucky coincidence” if those beliefs are correct. In other words, 
there is no epistemically significant modal connection between your crush beliefs and the 
crush facts. Mutatis mutandis, the idea goes, for your moral beliefs and the moral facts. 
                                               
4 See Street (2006: §§4-6) for an illuminating defense P1. See Huemer (2005: §8.6.3, 2016), 
Parfit (2011: 536), Fitzpatrick (2015: §3.2), and Isserow (forthcoming) on downplaying 
the influence of natural selection on our present moral beliefs; see Copp (2008) and Lott 
(2018) for reductionist responses; see Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong (2004: 20), Bogardus 
(2016), and Baras (2017a) on theistic responses; see Mogensen (2015) on invoking moral 
facts as proximate causes; and see Bengson (2015) for a rationalist approach. 
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Finally, the idea behind P3 is that you have no independent reason to think that you 
got lucky. Accordingly, once you acknowledge that you would have to have gotten lucky 
to end up with accurate moral beliefs, you shouldn’t think that you did. So you should 
suspend your moral beliefs. 
 
3. The Minimalist Gambit 
 A minimalist response to the debunking arguments is any response that involves 
granting P1 and denying one of the other premises. In practice, minimalists almost 
invariably resist the argument (so formulated) by denying P2. The exact form of the 
response will differ from one minimalist to the next, depending on which range of moral 
beliefs she is trying to vindicate and what sort of m-connection she is aiming to establish. 
But the core idea is always the same. The minimalist reasons from her antecedent moral 
beliefs to the conclusion that her moral beliefs are in one way or another m-connected, all 
the while granting that moral beliefs are not e-connected—that is, that they neither explain 
nor are explained by the moral facts. Call this the minimalist gambit.  
 (Some may worry that we have somehow “stacked the deck” against a certain strain 
of minimalism in how we have defined ‘e-connection’. Many minimalists hold that the 
noncoincidental accuracy of our moral beliefs is secured by a more attenuated explanatory 
connection, a “third factor” that explains both why we have the moral beliefs that we do 
and why the moral facts are as they are. We vindicate our terminological choices below 
(§8) by arguing that postulating a third-factor does not help the minimalist escape our 
objections, which suggests that our taxonomy does “carve at the joints”. In the meantime, 
take it as a matter of stipulation that these attenuated third-factor explanatory connections 
are not e-connections, and third-factor theorists do therefore count minimalists.) 
 To illustrate how the minimalist gambit is supposed to work, we’ll focus on how 
the minimalist gambit is supposed to secure one particular m-connection for one particular 
moral belief; though structurally identical strategies can be (and have been) deployed to 
cover other m-connections and other sorts of moral beliefs. Let us see, then, how the  
minimalist gambit can be used to show that the moral belief that feeding one’s own children 
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is good is a safe belief.5 As we are understanding it, S’s belief that p is safe iff S could not 
easily have been wrong about whether p. In other words, S is not wrong about whether p 
in any “nearby worlds”.6 
Step One:  The minimalist maintains that it’s no accident that feeding one’s children 
is good. After all, the idea goes, survival is (at least pro tanto) good and, thus, actions that 
promote survival are themselves (at least pro tanto) good insofar as they promote survival; 
accordingly, since it’s no accident that feeding one’s children promotes their survival, it’s 
no accident that feeding one’s children is good. This is not to say that it is impossible for 
feeding one’s children not to be good. There are a lot of worlds out there, including ones 
in which feeding your own children is a surefire way to kill them. But none of these are 
nearby worlds—that is to say, this is not something that could easily have happened. In all 
the nearby worlds, feeding one’s children is good. 
 Step Two: The minimalist observes that it is no accident that we believe that feeding 
one’s children is good. After all, aiming (as it does) at enhancing reproductive success, 
evolution is bound to favor beliefs that further that end by keeping our children alive. The 
belief that feeding one’s children is good furthers this end because believing an action to 
be good motivates one to perform it, and performing this particular action helps keep one’s 
children alive long enough to reproduce. Indeed, this belief enhances reproductive success 
not just in this world but also in the nearby worlds: feeding them couldn’t easily have failed 
to keep them alive nor could believing that it’s good to feed them easily have failed to 
motivate us to feed them. So it’s no accident that we believe that feeding one’s children is 
                                               
5 Our representative version of the gambit most closely resembles the one advanced by 
Nozick (1981: 346-348) and Enoch (2010, 2011), though neither focuses on safety 
explicitly; cf. Clarke-Doane (2015: 93, 2016: §2.3). See Huemer (2005: §8.6.4), Brosnan 
(2011), and Talbott (2015) for minimalist strategies that turn on the goodness and adaptive 
value of cooperation and which are poised to cover believed obligations to non-kin. See 
Wielenberg (2010, 2014: ch.4) on the reliability of beliefs about rights. See Skarsaune 
(2011) on the goodness of pleasure and Vavova (2015: §6) on the badness of pain. See 
Clarke-Doane (2015: §4, 2016: 26-27) on sensitivity and noncontingent moral truths. See 
Bedke (2014: §4) for an m-connection (“non-obliviousness”) that arguably cannot be 
captured. 
6 The epistemic notion of ‘safety’ can has been defined in other ways (see Rabinowitz 
2011). We have chosen a particularly strong notion of safety, so as not to rig things in our 
favor when we criticize the minimalist response below. 
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good. Again, this is not to say it’s impossible for us to have believed otherwise, only that 
that couldn’t easily have happened. In all nearby worlds, we believe that feeding one’s 
children is good. 
In all nearby worlds, feeding one’s children is good. In all those nearby worlds, we 
believe that feeding one’s children is good. Putting the pieces together (Step Three): we 
correctly believe, in all nearby worlds, that feeding one’s children is good. In other words, 
the belief is safe. Crucially, the reasoning does not at any point invoke an e-connection 
between moral beliefs and moral facts. Let all moral facts be as abstract, inert, and mind-
independent as you like. The reasoning still evidently goes through.7 
 
4. Begging Questions and Default Entitlement 
Cue the balking. Surely minimalists can’t just take it for granted that feeding one’s 
children is good! Why not? Because, the idea goes, relying on such moral beliefs begs the 
question. They’re using their moral beliefs—the very beliefs that debunkers are calling into 
question—to vindicate the very faculties responsible for those beliefs. Minimalists have 
been quick to dismiss the charge of begging the question, and we think they are right to 
dismiss it.8 So, before turning to our own objection to the minimalist strategy, let us briefly 
explain why the charge of question-begging misses the mark.  
                                               
7 It is worth mentioning a variation on the minimalist gambit, which involves denying P3. 
This one is decidedly less attractive, but what it lacks in plausibility, it makes up for in 
sheer chutzpah. Concede that it would take a massive stroke of luck to wind up with 
accurate moral beliefs. But then consult your moral intuitions, check whether it is good to 
feed one’s children, and find that it is. And, introspecting, check whether you believe that 
it’s good to feed one’s children, and find that you do. Putting these together, conclude that 
you correctly believe that it is good to feed one’s children. Repeat the process for other 
moral beliefs, and conclude that you have a great many accurate moral beliefs and that you 
must therefore have gotten miraculously lucky. Cf. Dworkin (1996: 125-127), White 
(2010: 589), Setiya (2012: ch. 2.2), Locke (2014b), Vavova (2014: 80-82), and McBee 
(2018) for discussion.   
8 For charges of question-begging (and the like), see Fraser (2014: 471), Vavova (2014: 
81), Street (2008: §6, 2011: §6), Shafer-Landau (2012: §6), Crow (2016), Joyce (2016: 
157-158), and Lott (2018: §2.2). For responses, see Schafer (2010: 475-476 and 487-488, 
forthcoming), White (2010: 588-592), Wielenberg (2010: 447, 2016: 506), Brosnan (2011: 
62), Enoch (2011: 117-121), Bedke (2014: §3.3), Setiya (2012: ch. 2.3), Berker (2014: §8), 
Locke (2014a: §5), Clarke-Doane (2015: 89, 2016: 31), Korman (2015: §7.6.1, 
forthcoming: §5), Baras (2017b: 209-2010), and Moon (2017). 
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We take it for granted that we are justified in believing a great many things. We do 
not expect any disagreement with the debunker on this point: the debunking argument is 
not meant to be an argument for generic skepticism; it is meant to target our moral beliefs 
specifically.9 Can the debunker make good on the (somewhat amorphous) charge of 
question-begging without relying on some generic skeptical principle? We don’t think they 
can. To see why, let’s consider three precisifications of the charge. 
 On a first precisification, one begs the question when one treats as evidence the 
very claims that one’s interlocutor is calling into question. The minimalist does do that. 
She takes for granted, in the face of the debunking arguments, that feeding one’s children 
is good. But there is good reason to reject the sort of “evidential neutrality” principles that 
would prohibit relying on contested beliefs.10 For such principles lead straight to sweeping 
skeptical results. All it would take is one encounter with a global skeptic or an unruly 
philosophy major to render all your beliefs unjustified.  
On a second precisification, one begs the question when one relies on the 
deliverances of some source of information without independent evidence of the source’s 
reliability. Minimalists do that as well: their appeals to the deliverances of their moral 
faculties isn’t accompanied by any independent evidence of the reliability of those 
faculties—independent, that is, of the deliverances of those very faculties. But one had 
better not insist that independent evidence of the reliability of a source is always needed 
before relying on that source, on pain of a fairly obvious regress. We need to allow that, in 
some cases, we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) entitlement to believe the deliverances 
of a source, even absent independent evidence of its reliability.11 Plausible candidates for 
such sources are perception, introspection, testimony, and memory, and we see no good 
reason—nor have debunkers provided good reason—to exclude moral sources from the 
list. 
                                               
9 Cf. Vavova (2015: 105). 
10 See, e.g., Nozick (1981: 197-198), Pryor (2004: §7), Williamson (2007: §7.3), and Kelly 
(2008: 73-76).  
11 See Burge (1993), Wright (2004), Field (2005), and White (2006) on the general need 
for something like default entitlement. For minimalist appeals to default entitlement, see 
Schafer (2010: 476, forthcoming) and Wielenberg (2016: 506). 
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On a third precisification, one begs the question when one engages in a certain kind 
of circular reasoning: reasoning from some beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs have 
some desirable epistemic feature. The minimalist does that too, insofar as she relies on her 
moral beliefs in the course of establishing their m-connectedness. But, as many have 
observed, prohibiting this sort of epistemic circularity across the board leads to sweeping 
skeptical results.12 Moreover, once we recognize the default entitlement to our moral 
beliefs, it is hard to see what could be illicit about reasoning from those beliefs to any 
conclusion one likes, so long as they entail or otherwise support that conclusion. 
All of us, minimalists included, enjoy a default entitlement to certain of our beliefs, 
even absent a non-question-begging defense of those beliefs. However, default entitlement 
does not amount to indefeasible entitlement, and our objection to the minimalist gambit in 
what follows is that their explanatory concession undermines any default entitlement they 
have to rely on moral beliefs. So the charge of question-begging is on to something; the 
minimalists’ reliance on their moral beliefs is indeed illicit. But it is illicit, not because they 
fail to meet some dubious requirement of evidence neutrality or independent evidence or 
noncircularity, but because they have a defeater for those beliefs. 
 
5. Defeat and Epistemic Priority 
 When one withholds belief about whether a certain range of beliefs are e-
connected—either believing that they aren’t or at least suspending belief about whether 
they are—let’s call this an explanatory concession.13 Explanatory concessions typically 
serve as defeaters for the associated beliefs. Recall the magic 8-ball (from §2). The 
realization that your beliefs about who has a crush on you aren’t explained by the facts 
                                               
12 See Alston (1986), Van Cleve (2003), Bergmann (2004), Vogel (2008), Titelbaum 
(2010), and Alexander (2011) in defense of circular reasoning. It has also been observed 
that debunkers themselves need to engage in some such circular reasoning if they are to 
prevent their debunking arguments from overgeneralizing to our perceptual beliefs; see 
Sosa (2002: 375), Gibbard (2003: ch. 13), Schafer (2010: 475-476), and Bedke (2014: 107-
108).   
13 Above, we told you what it is for moral beliefs to be e-connected but we haven’t yet told 
you what it is in general for a belief to be e-connected. Roughly, a belief is e-connected iff 
it explains or is explained by the sorts of facts it purports to be about. More on this in §8. 
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about who has a crush on you, and that believing it’s so doesn’t make it so, defeats those 
crush beliefs.  
Why is it that such explanatory concessions defeat, when they do? Put another way: 
is there something in virtue of which they serve as defeaters, and if so what is it? This is a 
question of epistemic priority. And it is this question that will take us to (what should be) 
the heart of the debate between the minimalist and her opponents. To see why we think 
that the debate turns on this question, let us consider two possible answers: a minimalist-
friendly answer and a minimalist-unfriendly answer. 
The minimalist-friendly answer to the priority question is that explanatory 
concessions have epistemic import only to the extent that the absence of the relevant e-
connection indicates the absence of one or another m-connection, and that it is the latter 
absence that ultimately does the defeating. Something like this is implicit in the usual 
presentations of the debunking arguments, in which subversive explanations are portrayed 
as doing their debunking work by way of revealing moral beliefs to be unsafe, or 
insensitive, or unreliable, or at best accidentally or coincidentally accurate. And if it’s true 
that explanatory concessions have merely derivative epistemic import, defeating only by 
way of revealing the absence of some m-connection, then this is a boon to minimalists. For 
as we saw, by relying on their antecedent moral beliefs—to which they are defeasibly 
entitled—minimalists are able to assure themselves that the lack of e-connection did not 
prevent them from forming m-connected beliefs.   
The minimalist-unfriendly answer is that explanatory concessions have 
nonderivative epistemic import. They undermine beliefs directly, and it is not in virtue of 
revealing the beliefs to be unsafe or unreliable or in some other way deficient that the 
concessions undermine those beliefs. If that’s right, then the minimalist gambit is a non-
starter. For in that case, the minimalist’s vindication of her beliefs proceeds from moral 
beliefs for which she already possesses a defeater, namely, her explanatory concession.14  
Thus, the fate of the minimalist strategy turns on a delicate question of epistemic 
priority. If explanatory concessions defeat (when they do) only in virtue of what they 
rationally commit us to saying about m-connections, then the minimalist gambit is in good 
                                               
14 See Moon (2017) for more on how already having a defeater can preclude “defeater-
deflection”. 
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epistemic standing. But if explanatory concessions defeat directly, then the minimalist 
gambit can’t get off the ground. 
 
6. Sensitivity First 
The minimalist gambit, as we just saw, presupposes that explanatory concessions 
defeat only in virtue of rationally committing one to the absence of some m-connection. 
Which m-connection? While we illustrated the minimalist gambit with safety above, there 
are other m-connections one might think are relevant here. We’ll return to safety below 
(§7), but let’s first consider an alternative answer: sensitivity. 
S’s belief that p is sensitive iff: were it not the case that p, S would not have believed 
that p. Suppose that minimalists identify sensitivity as the operative m-connection. That is, 
suppose that they embrace Sensitivity First: 
 
Sensitivity First  
Believing that one’s belief that p is not e-connected rationally commits one to 
withholding on one’s belief that p only by virtue of rationally committing one to 
believing that one’s belief that p is insensitive.15 
 
Choosing sensitivity as the operative m-connection would require minimalists to revise the 
vindicatory story from §3 somewhat, but we see no obstacle to doing so. If feeding one’s 
children weren’t good, this would be for some (relatively) mundane reason, for instance 
because people are prone to dangerously overfeeding their own children, making feeding 
something best left to nannies or medical professionals. If that were the case, we would no 
doubt be well aware that feeding one’s own children isn’t good. So the belief is sensitive. 
This line of reasoning does implicitly draw on antecedent moral beliefs.16 But this is just 
business as usual for the minimalist. 
                                               
15 Perhaps minimalists will wish amend the principle to say: “…only by virtue of rationally 
committing one to withholding belief that one’s belief that p is sensitive.” This amendment 
won’t affect what we go on to say below. Mutatis mutandis for Safety First (below). 
16 For instance, one must implicitly assume that we in fact has robust obligations to our 
children in order to rule out the actual world from being the closest world in which it’s not 
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 We’ll raise two problems for Sensitivity First. The first involves counterfactuals 
with necessarily false antecedents, otherwise known as “counterpossibles”. It was, for a 
time, widely believed that counterpossibles were all vacuously true. After all, the idea went, 
a counterfactual A®B is true so long as all the nearest possible A-worlds are B-worlds. If 
A is necessarily false, then there are no possible A-worlds and thus none that fail to be B-
worlds. Never mind whether this is the right view of counterpossibles (it’s not).17 Certainly 
its proponents were not irrational in accepting it. They had their reasons.  
 Suppose that Lois, one such rational advocate of vacuous counterpossibles, finds 
herself having a powerful intuition that Goldbach’s conjecture is true. She believes that it’s 
true, and believes moreover that Goldbach’s conjecture (like other mathematical truths) is 
necessarily true. She then remembers that she was recently hypnotized and—after watching 
the video—realizes that the intuition is the result of a post-hypnotic suggestion. Further, 
she is convinced that the hypnotist gave her this intuition for reasons having nothing to do 
with whether Goldbach’s conjecture is in fact true. She sees in the video that he flipped a 
coin to decide whether to give her a pro-Goldbach or an anti-Goldbach intuition. 
 The reasonable thing for Lois to do at this point is to suspend belief about 
Goldbach’s conjecture; the explanatory concession defeats the belief. But suppose that she 
attempts to assure herself that the belief is nevertheless in good standing, by noting its 
sensitivity. “Goldbach’s conjecture is true”—she says, helping herself to her intuitive 
belief—“and so it’s vacuously true that if it were false I wouldn’t have believed it.” Starting 
from a belief to which she is default entitled, she reasons her way to the sensitivity of the 
belief. Clearly, though, it is not rational for her to stand by her Goldbach belief, and her 
reasoning does nothing to improve her epistemic situation.  
 Why is it not rational for her to stand by her belief? The natural answer is that she 
has a defeater, and that defeater is the explanatory concession: she knows that she believes 
that Goldbach’s conjecture is true for reasons having nothing to do with how mathematical 
reality in fact is. If that’s right, then it must be that explanatory concessions have epistemic 
                                               
good to feed one’s children. Cf. Clarke-Doane (2015: §4, 2016: §2) and Korman 
(forthcoming: §6), both channeling Sturgeon (1988: §3). 
17 See Nolan (2013: §2.2) for discussion. 
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import that’s independent of what they reveal about sensitivity. Lois is a counterexample 
to Sensitivity First. 
 Our second complaint draws on familiar counterexamples to sensitivity constraints 
on knowledge. Here is a representative example, from Jonathan Vogel (2012: 130-131). 
Suppose you know in some completely ordinary way that Omar has new shoes. You can 
also thereby know—via a trivial inference—that you aren’t mistaken in believing that 
Omar has new shoes. But this further belief is not sensitive. Had you mistakenly believed 
that Omar has new shoes, you’d still think you weren’t mistaken in believing he has new 
shoes. In other words, this belief amounts to knowledge despite not being sensitive. (It’s 
worth noting that this case was designed to work—and does work—even against more 
sophisticated versions of sensitivity that hold fixed the particular belief-forming method 
the believer uses.) 
Even acknowledged insensitivity does not defeat. It’s not irrational for you to stand 
by your belief that you’re not mistaken about Omar’s new shoes—you double checked!—
even while appreciating the arcane philosophical point that you would have believed this 
even if (for some bizarre reason) it were false. But if that’s right, it’s just not plausible that 
explanatory concessions defeat by way of showing the associated beliefs to be insensitive. 
Recognized insensitivity isn’t, in itself, a threat to beliefs.  
To be sure, this isn’t a counterexample to Sensitivity First. Minimalists might grant 
the point, conceding that recognized insensitivity doesn’t always defeat, but insist that it 
does defeat when accompanied by explanatory concessions. But what could account for 
why it defeats only in these cases? Presumably what accounts for it is that it’s the 
explanatory concessions that are ultimately doing the defeating, pace Sensitivity First.  
The foregoing also has implications for disjunctive accounts of how explanatory 
concessions defeat (when they do). For instance, Justin Clarke-Doane (2015: §6, 2016: §4) 
advances the following account, which he dubs Modal Security. 
 
Modal Security  
Information, E, cannot undermine our D-beliefs without giving us some reason to 
believe that our D-beliefs are not both safe and sensitive. 
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Rendered as a claim about epistemic priority, the idea would be: 
 
Security First  
Believing that one’s belief that p is not e-connected rationally commits one to 
withholding on one’s belief that p only by virtue of rationally committing one to 
believing either that one’s belief that p is unsafe or that one’s belief that p is 
insensitive. 
 
What we have seen is that the safety disjunct would have to be doing all the heavy lifting. 
As we saw in the Lois case, reasoning one’s way to sensitivity doesn’t preclude explanatory 
concessions from defeating. And as we saw in the Omar case, getting reasons (indeed: 
conclusive reason) to think that one’s beliefs are insensitive doesn’t by itself undermine 
them. What this means is that, if Security First is true, then it must be because Safety First 
is true: 
 
Safety First  
Believing that one’s belief that p is not e-connected rationally commits one to 
withholding on one’s belief that p only by virtue of rationally committing one to 
believing that one’s belief that p is unsafe. 
 
So let’s turn now to Safety First. 
 
7. Safety First 
Safety First doesn’t fall victim to the Lois counterexample. Recall that S’s belief 
that p is safe iff S could not easily have been wrong about whether p. Lois may be able to 
reason her way to the sensitivity of her Goldbach belief but not to its safety. She could 
easily have been wrong about whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true, because the 
hypnotist’s coin could easily have landed tails, in which case he would have hypnotized 
her to believe that the Goldbach’s conjecture is false. And, while your belief about Omar’s 
new shoes is insensitive, it isn’t unsafe: it couldn’t easily have happened that you 
14 
 
mistakenly believed that he has new shoes. So Safety First doesn’t face the same problems 
as Sensitivity First. It faces different problems.  
Here is a counterexample to Safety First. Jack sees a streak in a cloud chamber and 
believes that the streak was caused by a proton. But Jack has not received the training of 
an ordinary physics student. Rather, has believes it because some Martians—after 
convincing him of their superior intellect—told him that protons cause those kinds of 
streaks. Moreover, they decide to tell him this, not because they themselves had done any 
physics, but simply because they liked the sound of the English word ‘proton’. You may 
even suppose, if you like, that there is some deep law of Martian psychology that makes 
them like the sound of the word ‘proton’, and so it could not easily have happened that the 
Martians told Jack that such streaks were caused by something else. Finally, let us suppose 
that after forming the belief that protons cause those streaks, Jack learns all these details 
about the origins of his belief, and concedes that his belief that the streaks are caused by 
protons is not explained by the facts about what causes them.18 
The reasonable thing for Jack to do at this point is to abandon his belief that such 
streaks are caused by protons. But suppose Jack retains the belief and attempts to vindicate 
it with the following line of reasoning: 
Yes, my belief that such streaks are caused by protons is not explained by the facts 
about what causes those beliefs. Still, given what I have just learned about Martian 
psychology, I could not easily have formed a different belief about whether such 
streaks are caused by protons. Moreover, such streaks are caused by protons, and—
since this interaction is surely underwritten by natural laws—it could not easily 
have failed to be the case that they are caused by protons. So the belief is safe: it’s 
true in all nearby worlds and I believe it in all nearby worlds.  
Starting from a belief to which he is default entitled—the testimonial belief that such 
streaks are caused by protons—he reasons his way to the safety of the belief.19 Clearly, 
                                               
18 This case is drawn from Locke (2014a). Clarke-Doane (2016: 32-33) addresses a similar 
case—framed as a putative counterexample to Modal Security—but it is unclear that his 
treatment of that case can be adapted to handle the cases we present here. 
19 See Burge (1993: 485) on default entitlement to testimonial beliefs. If you doubt that 
testimony is a source of default entitlement, you may instead suppose that Jack was 
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though, it is irrational for him to stand by his proton belief, and the reasoning does nothing 
to improve his epistemic situation.   
 Why is it irrational? The natural answer is that he has a defeater for the belief, and 
that defeater is his explanatory concession: he accepts that he believes such streaks are 
caused by protons for reasons having nothing to do with whether they’re in fact caused by 
protons. If that’s right, then it must be that explanatory concessions have epistemic import 
that’s independent of what they reveal about safety. Jack is a counterexample to Safety 
First.  
Here is a second counterexample. On the basis of clear and distinct intuitions, Neora 
believes in an all-powerful deity. Later, Agent Smith convinces her that she is part of a 
computer simulation. He tells her that the designers had a terrible time getting 
consciousness and cognition to arise in the simulation, but—through endless trial and 
error—found that they could achieve this result only by programming the inhabitants to be 
strongly disposed to believe in an all-powerful deity. Without such beliefs, the simulations 
would break down before they even got going. Neora believes everything he tells her. And 
she believes that the deity (if it does exist) had nothing to do with her religious intuitions 
and associated beliefs. Despite having now accepted all this, she doesn’t abandon her belief 
in an all-powerful deity.  
Surely it is irrational for Neora to retain this belief. Why? Because she has conceded 
that it is not e-connected. But her belief is safe by her lights. How so? Her intuitions are 
very plausibly a source of default entitlement. (Those who take moral faculties to be a 
source of default entitlement, at any rate, are hardly in a position to deny that religious 
intuitions enjoy the same status.) Starting from her intuitive belief that there is an all-
powerful deity, she concludes that this belief couldn’t easily have been false: after all, 
nothing could easily have stood in the way of such a being’s existing. Nor could she easily 
have believed otherwise, she reasons, since, as she learned from Smith, the only nearby 
worlds in which a simulation inhabited by her even exists are ones in which she has these 
religious beliefs. By her lights, then, she believes it in all nearby worlds and it’s true in all 
                                               
brainwashed to have an intuition or disposition to believe that protons cause those streaks, 
or to have experiences that (richly) present those streaks as caused by protons. 
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nearby worlds, so she isn’t mistaken in any nearby worlds: the belief is safe. And yet it’s 
defeated. Safety First is false. 
 Note that our claim is not that Jack’s or Neora’s vindicatory reasoning is exactly 
analogous to the minimalists’ vindicatory reasoning. Rather, the claim is that these are 
cases in which explanatory concessions defeat without revealing the defeated beliefs to be 
unsafe by the believers’ lights—which makes them counterexamples to Safety First. 
 One might worry that our counterexamples fail if we slightly alter our formulation 
of safety. S’s belief that p is safe, we said, iff S couldn’t easily have been mistaken about 
p. But consider safety*, where S’s belief that p is safe* iff S couldn’t easily have failed to 
have a correct belief about p. Even by their own lights, Jack’s proton belief and Neora’s 
deity belief aren’t safe* (exercise for the reader). So, perhaps minimalists can affirm 
Safety* First, which claims that explanatory concessions defeat by virtue of revealing 
beliefs to lack safety*. 
 But it’s hardly plausible that recognizing beliefs to be unsafe* undermines those 
beliefs. Suppose I pull a reputable encyclopedia off the shelf, flip to a random page, and 
read that Hume was born in 1711.20 The belief is unsafe*—I could easily have flipped to a 
different page and would have had no beliefs one way or the other about when Hume was 
born. But realizing this does not in any way jeopardize my newly formed Hume belief. It 
just isn’t plausible that explanatory concessions derive their explanatory import from a lack 
of safety*.21 
 
8. Never Mind the Gap 
 Minimalists might take the lesson of the Lois and Jack and Neora cases to be that 
Safety First or Sensitivity First just need to be tweaked in some other way, or that some 
other m-connection should be wheeled in to bridge the gap between explanatory 
concessions and defeat. But there is a more natural lesson to draw from these cases, namely 
                                               
20 Adapting an example from White (2010: 597). 
21 Alternatively, one might prefer a formulation of safety that is in one way or other 
relativized to methods. We leave it as a challenge to Safety Firsters to find some such 
relativization that does not fall victim to variants of our objections or to variants of known 
counterexamples to method-based safety constraints (see, e.g., Bogardus 2014 and Zhao 
forthcoming).  
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that explanatory concessions defeat directly, and not by way of indicating the absence of 
some m-connection, and that this is why Lois and Jack and Neora’s reasoning is illicit. 
There is no “gap” to be filled in explaining how explanatory concessions generate defeat. 
In that case, the minimalist gambit is a non-starter, for (as we saw in §5) the gambit 
crucially involves reasoning from antecedent moral beliefs that minimalists themselves 
concede are not e-connected.  
 Why think that there must be some gap to be filled, something in virtue of which 
explanatory concessions defeat when they do? To our knowledge, the only minimalist 
attempt to answer this question is due to Clarke-Doane (2015: 96-97). In defending his 
modal security principle (see §6 above), Clarke-Doane insists that once you have assured 
yourself that certain of your beliefs are safe and sensitive, then they are, by your lights, 
bound to be true. To think that some information, explanatory or otherwise, can undermine 
some beliefs without in any way challenging your conviction that they are bound to be true 
is, he says, “dubiously coherent” (2015: 96). In his words: “How could information 
obligate us to give up our beliefs of a kind while failing to threaten our judgment that they 
were (all but) bound to be true?” (2015: 97). So, the idea goes, if some explanatory 
information does undermine our beliefs, it must be by way of giving us reason to think that 
the beliefs are unsafe or insensitive. 
 We think the reasoning goes wrong at the very last step. True, explanatory 
information cannot rationally commit us to abandoning beliefs without threatening our 
judgment that those beliefs are bound to be true. But there is more than one way to threaten 
a judgment. One is by rebutting it, that is, by giving us reason to think that it is false. The 
other is by undercutting it, that is, by giving us reason to think that our reasons fail to 
support it. The envisaged explanatory concessions do undercut the minimalist’s stated 
reasons for thinking that our moral beliefs are safe, sensitive, or otherwise bound to be true, 
insofar as they undercut the antecedent moral beliefs used (in the minimalist gambit) in 
reasoning one’s way to an m-connection. 
 Clarke-Doane is right that explanatory revelations fail to give us positive reason to 
think that the moral beliefs aren’t bound to be true. Rather, they leaves us in the dark 
entirely, depriving us of any way of telling whether they are bound to be true. And that is 
18 
 
more than enough to “threaten” the judgment that they’re bound to be true, which opens 
the door to the explanatory concession obligating us to give up the beliefs.22 
Alternatively (but relatedly), minimalists might insist that explanatory concessions 
cannot defeat directly because, once you assure yourself that your beliefs are tracking the 
truth, it would be absurd to demand more than that. This does have some prima facie 
plausibility, which we suspect arises from an equivocation between a correlative and an 
explanatory reading of “tracking”.23 On the correlative reading, beliefs track some facts so 
long as there is a counterfactual covariance between them. On the explanatory reading, 
beliefs track some facts when there is a covariation underwritten by an e-connection. We 
agree that it would be overly demanding to ask for more than explanatory tracking. But 
assuring yourself of mere correlative tracking, we maintain, is not enough.   
Another possible strand of resistance comes from the concern that the sort of 
explanatory constraint on rational belief that we are proposing will be plagued by all the 
same problems as the long-ago-abandoned causal theory of knowledge. For instance, such 
theories and constraints threaten to cut against inferential beliefs. You observe the fire in 
the fireplace and are justified in believing that there is smoke coming out the chimney. Of 
course, the fact that smoke is coming out of the chimney does not explain (causally or 
otherwise) the belief that it is. But this realization surely does not undermine the belief.24  
This indeed is a counterexample to flat-footed formulations of the explanatory 
constraint, like the following: 
(EC) If S believes that her belief that p neither explains nor is explained by the fact 
that p, then S is thereby rationally committed to withholding belief that p. 
But it is not a problem for a more refined explanatory constraint, like the one we have been 
working with throughout. We said that a moral belief is e-connected if and only if it 
explains or is explained by some fact in the domain of moral facts, and we’ve argued that 
believing that your moral beliefs are not e-connected defeats those beliefs. Extrapolating 
from this, we get something like the following, more permissive explanatory constraint: 
                                               
22 See Woods (2018: §3.2) for further discussion of Clarke-Doane’s modal security 
principle. 
23 Cf. Bedke (2014: 105). 
24 The example is due to Goldman (1967: 365-366). 
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(EC*) If p is about domain D, and S believes that her belief that p is neither 
explained by nor explains some D-facts, then S is thereby rationally 
committed to withholding belief that p. 
Your belief that smoke is coming from the chimney is explained by facts about smoke and 
chimneys: it is the result of an inductive inference from past observations of smoke coming 
from chimneys with active fireplaces. So EC* doesn’t prescribe withholding belief that 
smoke is now coming out of the chimney.  
What EC* does rule out, however, is the minimalist’s vindicatory reasoning. The 
minimalist concedes that her moral beliefs—her beliefs about what’s right and wrong—
neither explain nor are explained by facts about what’s right or wrong. So EC* will entail 
that the minimalist is rationally required to withhold on her moral beliefs. 
 Admittedly, EC* faces problems of its own, and a full defense lies outside the scope 
of the paper. Even absent such a defense, we think that what the Jack and Neora cases 
clearly suggest is that there must be some such explanatory constraint on rational belief. 
The only question is what exactly it is.25 
Minimalists might grant the need for some explanatory constraint on rational belief, 
but suggest an alternative, minimalist-friendly replacement for EC. For instance:  
(EC**) If S believes that (i) her belief that p neither explains nor is explained by 
the fact that p and (ii) there is no single fact that (at least partially) explains 
both her belief that p and the fact that p, then S is thereby rationally 
committed to withholding belief that p. 
This will handle the smoke case, since the fire in the fireplace explains both the fact that 
there is smoke coming out of the chimney and your belief that there is. But it won’t 
                                               
25 One immediate worry for EC* is that it faces a sort of “generality problem” in specifying 
the relevant domains. No plausible constraint should prescribe withholding belief that the 
sun will rise tomorrow. But if that belief counts as being “about” the domain of facts about 
the future, then EC* does have this unwanted implication. So the proponent of EC* must 
supply some account of which domains are relevant to assessing whether a belief satisfies 
EC*. Thanks to David Killoren and several others for pressing us on this point. Your two 
authors are of two minds about how troubling this generality problem is. See Locke’s 
Cognition Defeat (2014b: 232), McCain’s EF (2014: §4.4 and 6.4), Lutz’s EAD (2017: 
§2), Schechter (2018: §3), and Korman’s EC5 (forthcoming: §8) for alternative approaches 
to formulating explanatory constraints, also tailor-made to handle inductive beliefs 
(including beliefs about the future). 
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prescribe withholding belief that feeding one’s children is good. For the fact that feeding 
one’s children promotes their survival serves as a “third factor”, both explaining why we 
believe that it’s good (together with the fact that survival-promoting moral beliefs are 
adaptive) and why it is good (together with the fact that survival is good). 
 The problem with EC** is that it cannot account for trivial variations of the cases 
from §7. For instance, suppose that Jack learns (in some entirely normal way) that a proton 
has just been fired through a cloud chamber. Drawing on his Martian belief that protons 
cause streaks in cloud chambers, and without looking at the cloud chamber, he concludes 
that there is a streak in the chamber. Indeed there is a streak in the chamber. Moreover, the 
fact that there is a streak and his belief that there is a streak have a common cause—the 
fact that a proton was fired through the chamber—and, relying on his antecedent proton 
beliefs, Jack can reason his way to that third-factor explanation. Yet, just as in the original 
Jack case, Jack clearly ought to withhold belief about whether there is a streak in the 
chamber, knowing what he does about the origins of his belief that protons cause streaks. 
EC** therefore fails to deliver the correct verdict, that Jack is required to withhold belief. 
(You had one job, explanatory constraint!) 
 Here is the more general lesson to draw about such third-factor explanations. Their 
apparent value—and, indeed, their advertised value in the work of Enoch and others—lies 
in their ability to explain the noncoincidental accuracy of moral beliefs. In other words, the 
value lies in their ability to secure an m-connection between facts and associated beliefs. 
But they are of little to no value in the present context, where we are trying to account for 
cases in which reasoning one’s way to an m-connection fails to vindicate the relevant 
beliefs. 
 
9. Upshots 
We have argued that explanatory concessions do not derive their epistemic import 
from what they reveal about safety, sensitivity, or other such m-connections. If we’re right 
about that, then it is neither here nor there that minimalists can reason from their antecedent 
moral beliefs to the m-connectedness of those beliefs, for those beliefs have already been 
undermined by minimalists’ explanatory concessions. Let us close by drawing out four 
further upshots of the foregoing.  
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First, the failure of minimalist strategies shows us what it would take to resist the 
evolutionary debunking argument: one must reject P1 and affirm some sort of e-connection 
between moral beliefs and moral facts. Reductive views on which the moral facts just are 
the very natural facts that ultimately explain our moral beliefs are still in the running. So 
are theistic views on which the moral facts influence our moral beliefs by way of making 
themselves known to an intelligent designer who ensures that evolutionary processes yield 
reliable moral faculties. So are rationalist views on which moral facts influence our moral 
beliefs via some sort of quasi-perceptual apprehension. These all have problems of their 
own, to be sure. But they are the sorts of responses that aren’t ruled out by what we have 
shown. 
 Second, the formulation of the debunking arguments with which we began is at best 
misleading, insofar as it suggests that explanatory concessions undermine one’s beliefs by 
way of revealing something about m-connections. Here is superior formulation, relying 
directly on an explanatory constraint on rational belief:  
(P1) Realists are rationally committed to believing that their moral beliefs are not e-
connected. 
(P2*) If p is about domain D, and S believes that her belief that p is neither explained 
by nor explains some D-facts, then S is thereby rationally committed to 
withholding belief that p. 
(C) So, realists are rationally committed to withholding from moral beliefs. 
  
Third, the objections we have raised against minimalist responses to moral 
debunking arguments seem to apply equally to minimalist responses to reliability 
challenges that arise in other literatures, for instance Mark Balaguer’s (1995) response to 
the Benacerraf challenge, Ernest Sosa’s (2002) and Joel Pust’s (2004) accounts of modal 
reliability, and Michael Bergmann’s (2002) response to Plantinga’s evolutionary argument 
against naturalism.26 In each of these cases, the strategy is to grant that our beliefs are not 
e-connected, but then reason from the disconnected beliefs to some account of our 
reliability. But, if our argument above is successful, then these minimalist strategies fail 
                                               
26 See also Korman (2014: §§3-4, 2015: §7.3, forthcoming: §7.2) against minimalist 
responses to debunking arguments against perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects.  
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for the same reasons as moral minimalism. The only viable responses to these challenges 
are “explanationist” responses on which our beliefs bear an appropriate explanatory 
connection to their subject matter. 
Finally, and more speculatively, we think that the considerations raised above can be 
adapted to show that minimalists have things exactly backwards. Safety and sensitivity are 
epistemic virtues because, and to the extent that, they are indicative of e-connectedness; 
becoming convinced that some beliefs are not sensitive, safe, or in some other way m-
connected undermines those beliefs (when it does) by virtue of indicating the absence of 
an e-connection. In other words, we should accept Explanation First: 
 
Explanation First 
Believing that one’s belief that p is not m-connected rationally commits one to 
withholding on one’s belief that p only by virtue of rationally committing one to 
believing that one’s belief that p is not e-connected. 
 
Explanation First draws support from cases of sensitivity without relief (e.g. Lois)—where 
reasoning one’s way to the sensitivity of one’s beliefs does not seem to vindicate those 
beliefs—as well as cases of safety without relief (e.g. Jack and Neora) and cases where the 
absence of insensitivity or safety seems to be no cause for concern (e.g. Omar’s shoes and  
Bogardus’s atomic clock).27 The lack of relief can be explained by the known absence of 
an e-connection, and the lack of concern can be explained by the known presence of an e-
connection. This suggests that, at bottom, it is e-connections doing the heavy epistemic 
lifting.28  
 
 
                                               
27 See Bogardus (2014: 299-306, 2016: 649-650). 
28 Many thanks to Dan Baras, Kelly Becker, Tomas Bogardus, David Enoch, David 
Killoren, David King, Nethanel Lipshitz, Tristram McPherson, Jonas Olson, Hille 
Paakkunainen, Daniel Story, the Marc Sanders Foundation, participants in the 2015 moral 
epistemology workshop at the Prindle Center for Ethics, and audiences at Eastern Illinois 
University, the University of Manitoba, UW-Madison, and UW-Milwaukee. 
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